Libya: Government

Principal Government Officials

Chief of State: Chairman of the National Transitional Council Mustafa Abdul-Jalil
Head of Government: Prime Minister Abdurrahim al-Keib

Libya's political system is in theory based on the political philosophy in Qadhafi's Green Book, which combines socialist and Islamic theories and rejects parliamentary democracy and political parties. In reality, Qadhafi exercises near-total control over major government decisions. During the first 7 years following the revolution, the Revolutionary Command Council, which included Colonel Qadhafi and 12 fellow army officers, began a complete overhaul of Libya's political system, society, and economy. In 1973, Qadhafi announced the start of a "cultural revolution" in schools, businesses, industries, and public institutions to oversee administration of those organizations in the public interest. On March 2, 1977, Qadhafi convened a General People's Congress (GPC) to proclaim the establishment of "people's power," change the country's name to the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, and to vest, theoretically, primary authority in the GPC.

The GPC is the legislative forum that interacts with the General People's Committee, whose members are secretaries of Libyan ministries. It serves as the intermediary between the masses and the leadership and is composed of the secretariats of some 600 local "basic popular congresses." The GPC secretariat and the cabinet secretaries are appointed by the GPC secretary general and confirmed by the annual GPC congress. These cabinet secretaries are responsible for the routine operation of their ministries, but Qadhafi exercises real authority directly or through manipulation of the peoples and revolutionary committees.

Qadhafi remained the de facto head of state and secretary general of the GPC until 1980, when he gave up his office. Although he holds no formal office, Qadhafi exercises power with the assistance of a small group of trusted advisers, who include relatives from his home base in the Sirte region, which lies between the traditional commercial and political power centers in Benghazi and Tripoli.

In the 1980s, competition grew between the official Libyan Government, military hierarchies, and the revolutionary committees. An abortive coup attempt in May 1984, apparently mounted by Libyan exiles with internal support, led to a short-lived reign of terror in which thousands were imprisoned and interrogated. An unknown number were executed. Qadhafi used the revolutionary committees to search out alleged internal opponents following the coup attempt, thereby accelerating the rise of more radical elements inside the Libyan power hierarchy.

In 1988, faced with rising public dissatisfaction with shortages in consumer goods and setbacks in Libya's war with Chad, Qadhafi began to curb the power of the revolutionary committees and to institute some domestic reforms. The regime released many political prisoners and eased restrictions on foreign travel by Libyans. Private businesses were again permitted to operate.

In the late 1980s, Qadhafi began to pursue an anti-Islamic fundamentalist policy domestically, viewing fundamentalism as a potential rallying point for opponents of the regime. Qadhafi's security forces launched a pre-emptive strike at alleged coup plotters in the military and among the Warfallah tribe in October 1993. Widespread arrests and government reshufflings followed, accompanied by public "confessions" from regime opponents and allegations of torture and executions. The military, once Qadhafi's strongest supporters, became a potential threat in the 1990s. In 1993, following a failed coup attempt that implicated senior military officers, Qadhafi began to purge the military periodically, eliminating potential rivals and inserting his own loyal followers in their place.

Qadhafi's strategy of frequent re-balancing of roles and responsibilities of his lieutenants makes it difficult for outsiders to understand Libyan politics. Several key political figures hold overlapping portfolios, and switch roles in a country where personalities and relationships often play more important roles than official titles. While high-ranking officials may have official portfolios, it is not uncommon for supposed subordinates to report directly to Qadhafi on issues thought to be within the purview of other officials. Foreign Minister Abdulati al-Obeidi was appointed to his position in March 2011, following the defection of his predecessor, Musa Kusa. Prime Minister al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi oversees the day-to-day operation of the Libyan cabinet, and plays a key role in setting financial and regulatory affairs, as well as domestic policies. Qadhafi’s sons play an important role in government circles. Qadhafi’s second son, Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, was previously viewed as a reformer but has emerged as a strong defender of the regime following the outbreak of political violence. His Qadhafi International Charity and Development Foundation (QDF) had served as a platform to advocate for greater respect for human rights, civil society development, and political and economic reforms. The QDF also played a key role in brokering dialogue with former Libyan Islamic Fighting Group members (LIFG), which led to their subsequent release from prison, and recantation of violence as a tool of jihad. Qadhafi’s younger sons, Khamis and Saadi, are commanding military units, while his fourth son, Mutassim, had served as National Security Adviser and continues to be involved in security and military relations.

The Libyan court system consists of three levels: the courts of first instance; the courts of appeals; and the Supreme Court, which is the final appellate level. The GPC appoints justices to the Supreme Court. Special "revolutionary courts" and military courts operate outside the court system to try political offenses and crimes against the state. "People's courts," another example of extrajudicial authority, were abolished in January 2005. Libya's justice system is nominally based on Shari'a law.

The Libyan Transitional National Council has set up a rival government in Benghazi. The 45-member Council includes representatives from throughout Libya and is headed by Chairman (and former Qadhafi Minister of Justice) Mustafa Abdul Jalil. The Council acts as the opposition’s legislative branch and has appointed an executive committee, headed by Mahmoud Jibril, to oversee interim governance issues. The TNC has stated repeatedly its desire to serve only as an interim body and has issued plans to draft a constitution and hold nationwide elections as soon as Qadhafi is removed from power.

FOREIGN RELATIONS
Since 1969, Qadhafi has determined Libya's foreign policy. His principal foreign policy goals have been Arab unity, the incorporation of Israel and the Palestinian Territories into a single nation of "Isratine," advancement of Islam, support for Palestinians, elimination of outside, particularly Western, influence in the Middle East and Africa, and support for a range of "revolutionary" causes.

After the 1969 coup, Qadhafi closed American and British bases on Libyan territory and partially nationalized all foreign oil and commercial interests in Libya. He also played a key role in promoting the use of oil embargoes as a political weapon for challenging the West, hoping that an oil price rise and embargo in 1973 would persuade the West, especially the United States, to end support for Israel. Qadhafi rejected both Soviet communism and Western capitalism, and claimed he was charting a middle course.

Libya's relationship with the former Soviet Union involved massive Libyan arms purchases from the Soviet bloc and the presence of thousands of east bloc advisers. Libya's use, and heavy loss, of Soviet-supplied weaponry in its war with Chad was a notable breach of an apparent Soviet-Libyan understanding not to use the weapons for activities inconsistent with Soviet objectives. As a result, Soviet-Libyan relations reached a nadir in mid-1987.

After the fall of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, Libya concentrated on expanding diplomatic ties with Third World countries and increasing its commercial links with Europe and East Asia. These ties significantly diminished after the imposition of UN sanctions in 1992. Following a 1998 Arab League meeting in which fellow Arab states decided not to challenge UN sanctions, Qadhafi announced that he was turning his back on pan-Arab ideas, which had been one of the fundamental tenets of his philosophy.

Instead, over the last decade, Libya pursued closer bilateral ties with North African neighbors Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco, and greater Africa. It has sought to develop its relations with Sub-Saharan Africa, leading to Libyan involvement in several internal African disputes in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, Mauritania, Somalia, Central African Republic, Eritrea, and Ethiopia. Libya has also sought to expand its influence in Africa through financial assistance, granting aid donations to impoverished neighbors such as Niger and oil subsidies to Zimbabwe, and through participation in the African Union. Qadhafi has proposed a borderless "United States of Africa" to transform the continent into a single nation-state ruled by a single government. This plan has been greeted with skepticism. In recent years, Libya has played a helpful role in facilitating the provision of humanitarian assistance to Darfur refugees in Chad, contributing to efforts to forge a ceasefire between Chad and Sudan, and bringing an end to the conflict in Darfur.

One of the longest-standing issues in Libya's relationship with the European Union and the international community was resolved in July 2007 with the release of five Bulgarian nurses and a Palestinian doctor who had been convicted in 1999 of deliberately infecting over 400 children in a Benghazi hospital with the HIV virus. The six medics were sentenced to death in 2004, a sentence that was upheld by the Libyan Supreme Court, but commuted in July 2007 by the Higher Judicial Council to life in prison. Under a previous agreement with the Bulgarian Government on the repatriation of prisoners, the medics were allowed to return to Bulgaria to finish their sentence, where upon arrival the Bulgarian president pardoned all six. The Benghazi International Fund, established by the United States and its European allies, raised $460 million to distribute to the families of the children infected with HIV, each of whom received $1 million.

Following Libya’s 2003 decision to dismantle its WMD programs and renounce terrorism, it sought to actively reengage the international community through improved bilateral relations with the West, as well as seeking leadership positions within international organizations. Libya served on the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Board of Governors from 2007-2008. From 2008-2009, it served a 2-year non-permanent tenure on the UN Security Council representing the Africa group. In 2009, Libya became chair for 1 year of the African Union and played host to several AU summits. The same year, it assumed the UN General Assembly presidency. Libya took over the Arab League presidency in 2010 and hosted the March and October 2010 Arab League summits and an Arab-African summit in October 2010.

After 40 years in power, Qadhafi made his first trip to the United States in September 2009 to participate in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in New York City and deliver his country’s speech. Qadhafi’s UNGA speech reinforced Libya’s assimilation within the international community and its emerging importance on the African scene. The trip came on the heels of the release from Scotland and return to Libya of convicted Pan Am 103 bomber Abdel Basset Ali Mohamed al-Megrahi.

Libya’s relations with the rest of the world deteriorated sharply following Qadhafi’s brutal suppression of popular protests in February 2011. The UN quickly took action to try to end the violence, passing UNSCR 1970 on February 26, which called for a referral to the International Criminal Court, an arms embargo, a travel ban, an asset freeze, and sanctions. UNSCR 1973, adopted on March 17, authorized member states to take military action to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack. Under the auspices of UNSCR 1973, the U.S., U.K., and France launched military action in Libya on March 20; NATO continued these efforts as “Operation Unified Protection.”

Working through the international Contact Group on Libya, key members of the international community, including the U.S., have joined together to increase pressure on the Qadhafi regime and support the TNC. Several countries, including France, Italy, Qatar, and the U.K., have recognized the TNC as Libya’s governing authority; countless others, including the U.S., have identified the TNC as the credible interlocutor of the Libyan people. More than 20 nations have diplomatic representation in Benghazi.

Terrorism
In 1999, the Libyan Government surrendered two Libyans suspected of involvement in the Pan Am 103 bombing, leading to the suspension of UN sanctions. On January 31, 2001, a Scottish court seated in the Netherlands found one of the suspects, Abdel Basset Ali al-Megrahi, guilty of murder in connection with the bombing, and acquitted the second suspect, Al-Amin Khalifa Fhima. Megrahi's conviction was upheld on March 14, 2002, but in October 2008 the Scottish High Court permitted Megrahi to appeal aspects of his case, formal hearings for which started in March 2009, when two separate requests for Megrahi’s release where concurrently considered by Scottish Justice authorities: the first involved Libya’s request for Megrahi’s transfer under the U.K.-Libya Prisoner Transfer Agreement, and the other for his release on compassionate grounds. After a Scottish medical committee announced that Megrahi’s life expectancy was less than 3 months (thereby falling under compassionate release guidelines), Scottish Justice Minister Kenny MacAskill granted Megrahi’s release from prison, and permitted him to return to Libya on August 20, 2009. The decision provoked widespread objections by the Lockerbie bombing victims’ families, who were particularly enraged by what appeared to be a “hero’s welcome” in Tripoli.

UN sanctions were lifted on September 12, 2003 following Libyan compliance with its remaining UNSCR requirements on Pan Am 103, including acceptance of responsibility for the actions of its officials and payment of appropriate compensation. Libya had paid compensation in 1999 for the death of British policewoman Yvonne Fletcher, a move that preceded the reopening of the British Embassy in Tripoli, and had paid damages to the non-U.S. families of the victims in the bombing of UTA Flight 772. With the lifting of UN sanctions in September 2003, each of the families of the victims of Pan Am 103 received $4 million of a maximum $10 million in compensation. After the lifting of U.S. IEEPA-based sanctions on September 20, 2004, the families received a further $4 million.

On November 13, 2001, a German court found four persons, including a former employee of the Libyan embassy in East Berlin, guilty in connection with the 1986 La Belle disco bombing, in which two U.S. servicemen were killed. The court also established a connection to the Libyan Government. The German Government demanded that Libya accept responsibility for the La Belle bombing and pay appropriate compensation. A compensation deal for non-U.S. victims was agreed to in August 2004.

By 2003, Libya appeared to have curtailed its support for international terrorism, although it may have retained residual contacts with some of its former terrorist clients. In an August 2003 letter to the UN Security Council, Libya took significant steps to mend its international image and formally renounced terrorism. In August 2004, the Department of Justice entered into a plea agreement with Abdulrahman Alamoudi, in which he stated that he had been part of a 2003 plot to assassinate Saudi Crown Prince Abdallah (now King Abdallah) at the behest of Libyan Government officials. In 2005, the Saudi Government pardoned the individuals accused in the assassination plot.

During the 2005 UN General Assembly session, Libyan Foreign Minister Abd al-Rahman Shalgam issued a statement that reaffirmed Libya's commitment to the statements made in its letter addressed to the Security Council on August 15, 2003, renouncing terrorism in all its forms and pledging that Libya would not support acts of international terrorism or other acts of violence targeting civilians, whatever their political views or positions. Libya also expressed its commitment to continue cooperating in the international fight against terrorism. On June 30, 2006, the U.S. rescinded Libya's designation as a state sponsor of terrorism.

In May 2008, the U.S. and Libya began negotiations on a comprehensive claims settlement agreement to resolve outstanding claims of American and Libyan nationals against each country in their respective courts. On August 4, 2008 President Bush signed into law the Libyan Claims Resolution Act, which Congress had passed on July 31. The act provided for the restoration of Libya’s sovereign, diplomatic, and official immunities before U.S. courts if the Secretary of State certified that the United States Government had received sufficient funds to resolve outstanding terrorism-related death and physical injury claims against Libya. Subsequently, both sides signed a comprehensive claims settlement agreement on August 14. On October 31, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice certified to Congress that the United States had received $1.5 billion pursuant to the U.S.-Libya Claims Settlement Agreement. These funds were sufficient to provide the required compensation to victims of terrorism under the Libyan Claims Resolution Act. Concurrently, President Bush issued an executive order to implement the claims settlement agreement.

In September 2009, several leading members of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) released a more than 400-page document in which they renounced violence and laid out what they claimed to be a clearer understanding of the ethics of Islamic Shari’a law and jihad, parting ways with Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups whose violent methods they described as ignorant and illegitimate. The release of this revisionist manuscript shortly followed a public statement in August 2009, in which LIFG’s leaders apologized to the Libyan leader for their violent acts and pledged to continue working toward a complete reconciliation with remaining elements of LIFG in Libya or abroad. LIFG’s revised ideology and the subsequent release of many of its imprisoned members was due in large part to a 2-year initiative by Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, in his capacity as Chairman of the Qadhafi International Charity and Development Foundation, to broker the reconciliation between the Libyan Government and elements of LIFG leadership.

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