Sudan: Government

Principal Government Officials

Chief of State: President Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir
Head of Government: President Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir

Elections
National elections took place from April 11-15, 2010. The elections were largely peaceful. However, there were widespread irregularities reported during the polling and counting periods, as well as serious restrictions on political space in both north and south leading up to and during the elections. The NCP and SPLM won the overwhelming majority of the electoral races, and incumbent presidents were elected for the Government of Sudan and the semi-autonomous Government of Southern Sudan.

Comprehensive Peace Agreement
The 2005 CPA established a new Government of National Unity and the interim Government of Southern Sudan and called for wealth-sharing, power-sharing, and security arrangements between the two parties. The historic agreement provides for a ceasefire, withdrawal of troops from southern Sudan, and the repatriation and resettlement of refugees. It also stipulated that by the end of the fourth year of an interim period there would be elections at all levels, including for national and southern Sudan president, state governors, and national, southern Sudan, and state legislatures. These elections were held in April 2010.

On July 9, 2005, the Presidency was inaugurated with al-Bashir sworn in as President and John Garang, SPLM/A leader, installed as First Vice President of Sudan. Ratification of the Interim National Constitution followed. The Constitution declares Sudan to be a “democratic, decentralized, multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, multi-religious, and multi-lingual State.”

On July 30, 2005, the charismatic and revered SPLM leader John Garang died in a helicopter crash. The SPLM/A immediately named Salva Kiir, Garang’s deputy, as First Vice President of the Government of National Unity and President of the Government of Southern Sudan.

Implemented provisions of the CPA include the formation of the National Legislature, appointment of Cabinet members, establishment of the Government of Southern Sudan and the signing of the interim Southern Sudan Constitution, and the appointment of state governors and adoption of state constitutions. The electoral law paving the way for national elections was passed in July 2008, and elections were held at six levels in April 2010. Laws governing the Southern Sudan and Abyei referenda and the popular consultations in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile were passed in December 2009, and the parties agreed in February 2010 to begin demarcation of the north-south border.

New CPA-mandated commissions have also been created. Thus far, those formed include the National Electoral Commission, Assessment and Evaluation Commission, National Petroleum Commission, Fiscal and Financial Allocation and Monitoring Commission, and the North-South Border Commission. The Ceasefire Political Commission, Joint Defense Board, and Ceasefire Joint Military Committee were also established as part of the security arrangements of the CPA.

With the establishment of the National Population Census Council, a population census was conducted in April/May 2008 in preparation for national elections that took place from April 11-15, 2010. The results from the census were released in early 2009. The CPA mandated that a referendum be held no later than January 2011, giving southerners the opportunity to vote either for unity within Sudan or separation, and that a parallel referendum be held for the people of Abyei to determine whether they wish to remain in the North or join the South.

On January 15, 2011 the week-long Southern Sudan referendum concluded, and official results were announced on February 7, 2011. More than 3.85 million people, or 97.58% of registered voters, participated with 98.83% voting for secession according to the final results. During the February 7, 2011 announcement ceremony, the Government of Sudan thanked the international community and issued the following statement: "In accordance with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and the Constitution of 2005, we accept the referendum result, and we renew our commitment to building constructive relations with the new state in the South." On the same day, President Barack Obama congratulated the people of Southern Sudan, and announced the United States' intent to formally recognize Southern Sudan as a sovereign, independent state in July 2011. In a separate statement on February 7, 2011, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton congratulated all of Sudan, and signaled the United States would initiate the process of withdrawing Sudan’s state sponsor of terrorism designation.

While significant progress has been made since 2005, and completion of the referendum is a major achievement, several post-referendum issues--including citizenship, security, debt, oil management, wealth sharing, and currency--remained unresolved as of April 2011. The parties continue to work through these issues, and the United States remains actively engaged through its support of the African Union High Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) and its chairman, President Thabo Mbeki.

The status of Abyei also remained unresolved as of April 2011. Although the boundaries of Abyei were defined through arbitration in The Hague in July 2009, and both sides have accepted the arbitration decision, issues persist and the Abyei boundary has not been demarcated. In August 2009, in conjunction with discussions facilitated by the United States, the two CPA parties signed an agreement charting a path forward on 10 points critical to implementation of the CPA. The parties continue to work through issues related to CPA implementation.

Popular consultations in Blue Nile are underway, citizen hearings have been completed, and technical hearings should begin in April 2011. The process in Southern Kordofan remains on hold until state-level elections scheduled for May are concluded; voter registration for the May elections was completed in February 2011.

In March 2011, Princeton N. Lyman became U.S. Special Envoy for Sudan, replacing J. Scott Gration.

Darfur
In 2003, while the historic north-south conflict was on its way to resolution, increasing reports began to surface of attacks on civilians, especially aimed at non-Arab tribes in the extremely marginalized Darfur region of Sudan. A rebellion broke out in Darfur, led by two rebel groups--the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). These groups represented agrarian farmers who are mostly non-Arabized black African Muslims. In seeking to defeat the rebel movements, the Government of Sudan increased arms and support to local, rival tribes and militias, which have come to be known as the "Janjaweed." Their members were composed mostly of Arabized black African Muslims who herded cattle, camels, and other livestock. Attacks on the civilian population by the Janjaweed, often with the direct support of Government of Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), have led to the death of hundreds of thousands of people in Darfur, with an estimated 2 million internally displaced people and another 250,000 refugees in neighboring Chad.

On September 9, 2004, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "genocide has been committed in Darfur and that the Government of Sudan and the Janjaweed bear responsibility--and that genocide may still be occurring." President George W. Bush echoed this in July 2005, when he stated that the situation in Darfur was "clearly genocide."

Intense international efforts to solve the crisis got underway, and a cease-fire between the parties was signed in N’Djamena, Chad, on April 8, 2004. However, despite the deployment of an African Union (AU) military mission to monitor implementation of the cease-fire and investigate violations, violence continued. The SLM/A and JEM negotiated with the Government of Sudan under African Union auspices, resulting in an agreement being signed regarding additional protocols addressing the humanitarian and security aspects of the conflict on November 9, 2004. Like previous agreements, however, these were violated by both sides. Talks resumed in Abuja on June 10, 2005, resulting in a July 6 signing of a Declaration of Principles. Further talks were held in the fall and early winter of 2005 and covered power sharing, wealth sharing, and security arrangements. These negotiations were complicated by a split that occurred in SLM/A leadership. The SLM/A now had a faction loyal to Minni Minawi and a faction loyal to Abdel Wahid.

The African Union, with the support of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the U.S., and the rest of the international community, began deploying a larger monitoring and observer force in October 2004. The UNSC had passed three resolutions (1556, 1564, and 1574), all intended to compel the Government of Sudan to rein in the Janjaweed, protect the civilian population and humanitarian participants, seek avenues toward a political settlement to the humanitarian and political crisis, and recognize the need for the rapid deployment of an expanded African Union mission in Darfur. The U.S. has been a leader in pressing for strong international action by the United Nations and its agencies.

A series of UNSC resolutions in late March 2005 underscored the concerns of the international community regarding Sudan's continuing conflicts. Resolution 1590 established the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) for an initial period of 6 months and decided that UNMIS would consist of up to 10,000 military personnel and up to 715 civilian police personnel. It requested UNMIS to coordinate with the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to foster peace in Darfur, support implementation of the CPA, facilitate the voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons, provide humanitarian demining assistance, and protect human rights. The resolution also called on the Government of Sudan and rebel groups to resume the Abuja talks and support a peaceful settlement to the conflict in Darfur, including ensuring safe access for peacekeeping and humanitarian operations.

Resolution 1591 criticized the Government of Sudan and rebels in Darfur for having failed to comply with several previous UNSC resolutions, for ceasefire violations, and for human rights abuses. The resolution also called on all parties to resume the Abuja talks and to support a peaceful settlement to the conflict in Darfur; it also forms a monitoring committee charged with enforcing a travel ban and asset freeze of those determined to impede the peace process or violate human rights. Additionally, the resolution demanded that the Government of Sudan cease conducting offensive military flights in and over the Darfur region. Finally, Resolution 1593 referred the situation in Darfur to the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and called on the Government of Sudan and all other parties to the conflict in Darfur to cooperate with the ICC.

Following the UNSC resolutions and intense international pressure, the Darfur rebel groups and the Government of Sudan resumed negotiations in Abuja, Nigeria in early 2006. On May 5, 2006, the government and an SLM/A faction led by Minni Minawi signed the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). Unfortunately, the conflict in Darfur intensified shortly thereafter, led by rebel groups who refused to sign. In late August government forces began a major offensive on rebel areas in Northern Darfur. On August 30, the Security Council adopted UNSCR 1706, authorizing the transition of AMIS to a larger more robust UN peacekeeping operation. To further facilitate an end to the conflict in Darfur, President Bush announced the appointment of Andrew S. Natsios as the Special Envoy for Sudan on September 19, 2006.

In an effort to resolve Sudan’s opposition to a UN force, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and African Union Commission Chair Alpha Oumar Konare convened a meeting of key international officials and representatives of several African and Arab states in Addis Ababa on November 16, 2006. The agreement reached with the Government of Sudan provided for graduated UN support to AMIS culminating in the establishment of a joint “hybrid” AU-UN peacekeeping operation in Darfur.

International efforts in 2007 focused on rallying support for DPA signatory and non-signatory rebel movements to attend renewed peace talks, and on finalizing plans for the joint AU/UN hybrid operation. UN Security Council Resolution 1769 was adopted on July 31, 2007, providing the mandate for a joint AU/UN hybrid force to deploy to Darfur with troop contributions from African countries. The Joint AU-UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) was to assume authority from AMIS in the field no later than December 31, 2007.

Following the passage of UNSCR 1769, a conference was held August 3-5 in Arusha, Tanzania between key UN and AU officials and delegates from Darfur rebel groups. Many movements’ political and military leaderships were brought into the discussion in preparation for earnest peace talks. Peace talks between the Government of Sudan and rebel factions took place in Sirte, Libya on October 27, 2007. However, limited rebel participation and continuing disagreement about objectives and processes limited the effectiveness of these talks. Following the Sirte talks, the SPLM hosted workshops in Juba, Southern Sudan, to unite the rebel groups and allow them to come together to present a common front during negotiations. The Juba talks led to a consolidation of rebel factions down to five groups from an estimated 27. On December 21, 2007 President Bush announced the appointment of Richard S. Williamson as Special Envoy for Sudan, following the resignation of Andrew S. Natsios.

On July 14, 2008 the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), Luis Moreno-Ocampo, announced that he was seeking an arrest warrant for President Bashir for allegedly masterminding genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity in Darfur. In order to move quickly to find a solution to the violence in Darfur under the pressure of a possible ICC indictment, Sudan opened the Sudan People’s Initiative in October 2008. The conference brought together many Darfur rebel groups with the government for a conference to explore solutions and how to better implement the existing framework of the DPA. It culminated in the announcement of a unilateral Darfur ceasefire, which was reportedly violated within days of the declaration.

On March 4, 2009 the ICC announced that it was issuing an arrest warrant for President Bashir for crimes against humanity and war crimes. The three-judge panel that issued the warrant did not feel there was enough evidence to include the crime of genocide on the warrant. In response to the ICC indictment, the Government of Sudan expelled 13 international non-government organizations (NGOs) and closed down three Sudanese NGOs, which severely hindered international humanitarian aid efforts in Darfur. Despite the warrant for his arrest, Bashir has traveled freely to a number of countries in Africa and the Middle East since his indictment.

In early 2009, the Joint African Union-United Nations Chief Mediator Djibril Bassole convened talks in Doha, Qatar, between the Government of Sudan and several Darfuri rebel groups, most notably JEM. Although JEM and the government signed a goodwill agreement in February 2009, talks collapsed in May over prisoner swaps and humanitarian access. Throughout the summer of 2009, the AU-UN mediation team worked individually with the parties and civil society to prepare for a new round of negotiations, while President Obama’s Special Envoy to Sudan, J. Scott Gration, supported these efforts by working to unify a number of splintered rebel factions in preparation for negotiations, and pressing the government to commit to a new round of talks. In November 2009, the mediation team organized a series of meetings in Doha between the parties and Darfuri civil society in an effort to better represent the voices of the Darfuri people in the peace process.

On January 15, 2010, Sudan and Chad signed an accord in N’Djamena, Chad, to secure their joint border and remove the threat posed to one another by cross-border rebel proxies operating on Sudanese and Chadian territory. The U.S. supported the signing of this agreement, which, if fully implemented, could help to improve the security situation on the ground in Darfur. On April 13, 2010, the parties announced that elements of the joint border force had been deployed and the border had been officially opened for commerce and transit.

On February 3, 2010, the ICC Appeals Court decided that the original three-judge panel used too high an evidentiary standard to omit genocide from the March 4, 2009, indictment of Bashir, and instructed the panel to revisit its decision. On July 12, 2010 the ICC issued a second arrest warrant for Bashir, adding genocide to charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity.

On February 23, 2010, the Government of Sudan and JEM signed a 12-point framework agreement in Doha, in which the parties agreed to a ceasefire, a prisoner release, and the opening of a new round of formal negotiations. In the wake of this initial progress with JEM, several other armed movements, including SLA factions unified by the efforts of the U.S. and Libya, joined together in Doha under the umbrella of the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM). On March 18, 2010, the Government of Sudan and the LJM signed a framework agreement and a ceasefire. Although negotiations in Doha were suspended during the April 11-15 national elections, talks between the Government of Sudan and the LJM resumed in June 2010. On May 3, JEM announced that it was “freezing” its participation in the Doha talks due to the Government of Sudan’s offensive against JEM positions in Jebel Moon, West Darfur. Since that time, the talks between the Government of Sudan and the LJM have continued. The African Union/United Nations Joint Chief Mediator announced at the beginning of September, along with the host Government of Qatar, a timeline that would produce a final outcome document from these negotiations. Doha mediation teams have continued to work on a final document, with JEM sending a small delegation on December 16, 2010 and Abdul Wahid’s faction of the SLA considering sending representation following a press by the international community for negotiations without preconditions. The Government of Sudan has urged the conclusion of the Doha talks in favor of a Darfur Political Process (DPP). The DPP would include consultations with a broad spectrum of Darfur civil society members, in addition to rebel groups, and culminate in the All-Darfur Conference (ADC), an inclusive forum intended to establish a corporate representation of Darfuris to finalize the elements of a political settlement for Darfur. The United States continues to support the Doha process as there are ongoing concerns about the enabling environment for talks in Darfur.

Humanitarian Situation
Sudan continues to cope with the countrywide effects of conflict, displacement, and insecurity. During more than 20 years of conflict between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), violence, famine, and disease killed more than 2 million people, forced an estimated 600,000 people to seek refuge in neighboring countries, and displaced approximately 4 million others within Sudan, creating the world's largest population of internally displaced people. Since the 2005 signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which officially ended the North-South conflict, the UN estimates that nearly 2 million displaced people have returned to Southern Sudan and the Three Areas of Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile, and Abyei. As of September 2009, the UN estimated that Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA)-related violence had displaced approximately 85,000 people in Southern Sudan, including more than 18,000 refugees from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Central African Republic. In addition, inter-ethnic conflict in Jonglei, Upper Nile, and Lakes states has killed more than 2,000 people and displaced approximately 250,000 individuals since January 2009.

In March 2009, following the ICC’s issuance of the arrest warrant for Bashir, the Government of Sudan expelled 13 international humanitarian aid organizations from Sudan and shut down three national aid organizations in a decision it publicly claimed was “long-overdue.” These organizations served as U.S. Government and UN implementing partners for the provision of, among other services, water and sanitation, health care, and protection, and their forced departure, according to the UN, affects 50% of aid delivery in Sudan. In the absence of expelled non-governmental organizations (NGOs), UN agencies and remaining NGOs stepped in to fill some of the critical gaps and address immediate humanitarian needs. The UN, the United States, and other members of the international community have since urged the Government of Sudan to reverse its decision on the expulsions, to identify and respond to gaps in life-saving operations, and to facilitate an orderly transition to working through the remaining NGOs. On March 18, 2009 President Obama announced the appointment of J. Scott Gration as the U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan. Special Envoy Gration negotiated with the Government of Sudan to allow the entry of four new NGOs to help address the humanitarian gaps. The Government of Sudan has been somewhat cooperative regarding the loosening of some administrative and bureaucratic impediments that have hindered the fast and effective delivery of humanitarian assistance in the past.

The conflict in the western region of Darfur entered its seventh year in 2010, despite a 2006 peace agreement--the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA)--between the Government of National Unity and one faction of the Sudan Liberation Army, that of Minni Minawi. It remains to be seen whether the ongoing Doha peace process will be able to effectively help quell the fighting in Darfur among armed opposition group factions, the Sudanese Armed Forces, and militias, which continued to displace thousands of civilians into 2010--230,000 since January 2008 alone. The complex emergency in Darfur affects approximately 4.2 million people, including more than 2.7 million internally displaced people, approximately 250,000 refugees in Chad, and approximately 50,000 refugees in the Central African Republic.

The U.S. Government is the leading international donor to Sudan and has contributed more than $8 billion in humanitarian, development, peacekeeping, and reconstruction assistance for the people in Sudan and eastern Chad since 2005, including more than $2 billion in FY 2009 alone. The U.S. Mission in Sudan has declared disasters due to the complex emergency on an annual basis since 1987. On October 1, 2009, President Obama renewed the Sudan complex emergency disaster declaration for FY 2010. The U.S. Government continues to lead the international effort to support implementation of the CPA, while providing for the humanitarian needs of conflict-affected populations throughout the country. U.S. Government humanitarian assistance to Sudan includes food aid, provision of health care, water, sanitation, and hygiene, as well as programs for nutrition, agriculture, protection, and economic recovery.

FOREIGN RELATIONS
Solidarity with other Arab countries has been a feature of Sudan’s foreign policy. When the Arab-Israeli war began in June 1967, Sudan declared war on Israel. However, in the early 1970s, Sudan gradually shifted its stance and was supportive of the Camp David Accords.

Relations between Sudan and Libya deteriorated in the early 1970s and reached a low in October 1981, when Libya began a policy of cross-border raids into western Sudan. After the 1985 coup in Sudan, the military government resumed diplomatic relations with Libya, as part of a policy of improving relations with neighboring and Arab states. In early 1990, Libya and the Sudan announced that they would seek "unity," but this unity was not implemented.

During the 1990s, as Sudan sought to steer a nonaligned course, courting Western aid and seeking rapprochement with Arab states, its relations with the U.S. grew increasingly strained. Sudan’s ties with countries like North Korea and Libya and its support for regional insurgencies such as Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Eritrean Islamic Jihad, Ethiopian Islamic Jihad, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Lord’s Resistance Army generated great concern about its contribution to regional instability. Allegations of the government’s complicity in the assassination attempt against the Egyptian President in Ethiopia in 1995 led to UNSC sanctions against the Sudan. By the late 1990s, Sudan experienced strained or broken diplomatic relations with most of its nine neighboring countries. However, since 2000, Sudan has actively sought regional rapprochement that has rehabilitated most of these relations.

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